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The Role of Athlete-Agents and the Law: A
Conflict of Interest?
Justin Park1

I

n 1983, running back Billy Sims was entering the last year in
a three-year contract with the Detroit Lions. The managers of
the Lions offered Sims a $3.5 million contract extension to keep
him in Detroit; however, knowledge of the contract extension never
reached him.2 Sims’ agent, Jerry Argovitz, having a significant financial interest in the USFL expansion team, the Houston Gamblers,
wanted Sims to sign with the Gamblers and did not relay to him
the news of the contract extension.3 Instead, Argovitz negotiated a
contract for Sims with the Houston Gamblers for $3.5 million. Argovitz did not represent his client’s best interest; in contrast, he used
his client’s exorbitant earning potential to create financial gain for
himself. Argovitz’s actions warranted a lawsuit in Detroit Lions, Inc.
v. Argovitz,4 although numerous laws and regulations have since been
enacted concerning athlete-agents, they still do not effectively prevent
similar problems from occurring. Rather, the laws rely on legal ideas
whose definitions are disputed. This is a major issue, considering the
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immense opportunity to exploit professional athletes’ substantial
earnings.
Large annual salaries are seen in other sports leagues such as the
NBA, NHL and recently, the MLS. In 2013, the average salary for
a major league baseball player was $3,386,212, while the minimum
salary for 2014 was set at $500,000.5 Although athletes and executives benefit monetarily from the success of the multi-billion dollar sports industry in the U.S.,6 they are not the only parties taking
advantage of the financial success of professional sports. Representatives of professional athletes, known as athlete-agents or “sports
agents” can earn millions of dollars by representing professional athletes in contract negotiations and other services. Current regulations
allow athlete-agents to earn up to 3%,7 4%,8 4%9, and 5%10 in the
NFL, NHL, NBA and MLB respectively. Due to the high earning
potential of athlete-agents and the relatively low number of potential clients, the athlete-agent industry is a highly competitive field
in which agents compete fiercely for clients in order to cash-in on
potentially lucrative professional-sports-services contracts.
For many athlete-agents, revenue from contract negotiations is
only the tip of the iceberg as far as moneymaking is concerned. Providing financial services from the money earned from contracts can
be turned into large amounts of cash through investments and other
5
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Jan. 16, 2015).
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business opportunities initiated by the athlete-agent. However, legal
issues are prone to arise from what happens to the money after the
contract has been negotiated. These issues particularly concern conflicts of interests and violations of the fiduciary duty that the athleteagent has towards his/her clients.
While this review does not consider all aspects of the athleteagent industry, it will focus on the fiduciary relationship between
athlete-agents and athletes. This review will examine how the relationship is defined by current laws and regulations and how it is
threatened by deficiencies within them, which allow athlete-agents
to engage in practices that take advantage of their clients. Reform,
such as a separation of duties in the form of a law or regulation, is
needed in order for the laws and regulations to more appropriately
govern athlete-agents considering they are engaged in a fiduciary
relationship with their clients.
Section I of this paper will specify the problem and introduce
the various responsibilities of an athlete-agent as well as the fiduciary duty. Section II will examine legislation and regulations placed
upon athlete-agents, including the UAAA, SPARTA and the players
associations’ regulations. Section III will discuss the fiduciary relationship between athlete-agents and athletes in the context of current
laws and regulations. Finally, section IV will explore possible remedies and their counterarguments for the issue at hand.

I. Roles of an Athlete-Agent and the Fiduciary Duty
It is safe to say that athlete-agents play an important role in managing many aspects of athletes’ lives. For example, they assume significant responsibilities through representing their clients in a wide
range of matters, including:
Contract negotiations, tax planning, financial planning,
money management, investments, estate planning, income
tax preparation, incorporating the client, endorsements,
sports medicine consultation, physical health consultation,
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post-career development, career and personal development
and counseling, legal consultation and insurance matters.11
Due to the complex and important nature of the services that an athlete-agent may provide, laws and regulations have been established
in order to attempt to protect athletes from unscrupulous activities
perpetrated by athlete-agents. However, the current laws and regulations do not effectively define the role of the agent-athlete. A clear,
defined role for the athlete-agent as well as stipulations to limit his/
her power will reduce conflict of interest, namely a separation of duties between contract negotiation and financial advisement.
This clearer and more defined role within the laws and regulations concerning athlete-agents is necessary because athlete-agents’
owe their clients a fiduciary duty,12 which is the “legal duty to act
solely in another party’s interests.”13 The opportunity for significant
monetary gain as well as the wide range of services that are offered
by athlete-agents often leads to problematic actions by the athleteagent due to an overreliance on the somewhat vague definition of
fiduciary duty.14 Often, these problems come in the form of mismanagement of the client’s money, improper incentives, and other
activities that violate those fiduciary duties. These all-too-common
improprieties create the perception that the athlete representation
business is “composed of individuals too willing to compromise ethics and competent representation for financial gain.”15
While the current laws and regulations limit athlete-agents’
power in order to prevent legal issues, athlete-agents still retain the
ability to act in behalf of athletes in a wide range of services that
could possibly lead to a conflict of interest, which is a “situation that
11

Walter T. Champion, Jr., Attorneys Qua Sports Agents: An Ethical Conundrum, 7 Marq. Sports L.J. 349, 351-52 (1997).
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can undermine a person due to self interest,”16 thus violating the fiduciary duties owed to the client. Therefore, the relationship between
the agent and the athlete is very complex and at times problematic.

II. UAAA, SPARTA and the Players Associations
In 2013, former NFL player Terrell Owens sued his former agent
Drew Rosenhaus for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and negligence.17
Rosenhaus allegedly advised Owens and dozens of other clients to
invest their money with Jeff Rubin. Rubin, a close business associate
of Drew Rosenhaus, invested the athlete’s money in a now bankrupt
casino, costing the athletes as much as $43.6 million.18 The point of
conflict is not necessarily that Jeff Rubin was an inexperienced and
unskilled financial manager; it is that Rosenhaus potentially violated
his fiduciary duty by advising his clients to invest their money in his
business associate’s failed casino project. Rosenhaus denies any relationship to the casino,19 and his allegations of a breach of fiduciary
relationship remain contested due to the inadequate existing laws
and regulations.
Unfortunately, the example of Drew Rosenhaus is just the most
recent in a long line of athlete-agents who have been accused of
taking advantage of their clients for personal gain. Because athleteagents have such a responsibility-assuming relationship with their
clients, they have the opportunity to use their clients’ high earnings
for their own leverage and personal gain. This violation of trust between athletes and athlete-agents is nothing new, as lawmakers took
16

Conflict of Interest Definition, Thelawdictionary.org, http://thelawdictionary.org/conflict-of-interest/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
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Rosenhaus, Sports Illustrated, Aug. 23, 2013, http://www.si.com/siwire/2013/08/23/terrell-owens-drew-rosenhaus-suing-lawsuit.
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Rand Getlin & Jason Cole, Prominent NFL Agent Drew Rosenhaus Scrutinized for Relationship with Former Financial Advisor, Yahoo Sports,
Sept. 4, 2012, http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nfl--prominent-nfl-agentdrew-rosenhaus-scrutinized-for-relationship-with-former-financial-adviser-.html.
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action at the beginning of this century to further prevent these types
of injustices. Two different pieces of legislation were created, which
have attempted to more clearly define the relationship between athlete-agent and athlete: the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2000) and
the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (2004).
The Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2000), also known as UAAA,
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws20 and has been implemented by 40 states.21 The
UAAA was meant to provide uniformity among the states by offering a centralized law that would counteract the many conflicting
laws concerning athlete-agents, which varied from state to state.22
The UAAA (2000) concerns itself mostly with student-athletes
and their relationship with athlete-agents. The act defines a studentathlete as: “an individual who engages in, is eligible to engage in,
or may be eligible in the future to engage in, any intercollegiate
sport.”23 Student-athletes are protected by the UAAA from athleteagents’ recruitment practices while they remain student-athletes.
Under the act, athlete-agents may not “give any materially false or
misleading information,”24 “furnish anything of value to a studentathlete before the student-athlete enters into the agency contract,”25
or “furnish anything of value to any individual other than the student-athlete or another registered athlete agent.”26 These restrictions,
along with others, are, if broken, punishable by law in the states that

20

Need for and Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA), NCAA.
com, http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism/need-andbenefits-uniform-athlete-agents-act-uaaa (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).

21

UAAA Laws in the 50 States, NCAA.org, http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/ENF/
UAAA/map/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).

22
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Unif. Athlete Agent Act § 2-12 U.L.A. (2000).
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have adopted the UAAA.27 These measures are necessary to protect
the amateur status of collegiate athletes.
Although the primary purpose of the UAAA is focused on
protecting student-athletes up until they become professionalathletes, portions of the act specify qualification requirements for
athlete-agents. The act states that individuals may not act as athleteagents unless they are registered with each state that has adopted
the UAAA.28 Under the UAAA athlete-agents are also required to
provide pertinent information found in the agency contract with the
athlete. One function of the agency contract, under UAAA specifications, is to warn the student-athlete that his/her collegiate eligibility
will be lost if they request the services of an agent.29 It also instructs
athlete-agents to inform the student-athlete’s athletic director within
72 hours of signing the agency contract, thereby, protecting the educational institution from damaging NCAA penalties.30 Therefore the
UAAA, first and foremost, protects educational institutions from
NCAA sanctions; secondly, it protects student-athletes from being
considered ineligible to compete at the collegiate level. While the
UAAA achieves its purpose in regulating athlete-agents’ activities
with student-athletes, it fails to appropriately define and structure
the agent-athlete relationship in legal terms. The act is void of any
restrictions that effect athletes after they have finished their collegiate careers. The relationship between athlete-agent and the postcollegiate athlete is left untouched.
Like the UAAA, the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act
(2004), also known as SPARTA, primarily protects educational institutions as well as student-athletes. However, SPARTA is federal
law that was enacted by Congress in 2004. Although it is intended to

27

Unif. Athlete Agent Act, supra note 23 § 15.
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work congruently with the UAAA,31 it repeats many points found in
the UAAA. Similar to the UAAA, SPARTA inadequately addresses
the post-collegiate relationship between athlete and athlete-agent.
In essence, SPARTA is a simplified and more direct version of the
UAAA. Although both SPARTA and the UAAA provide a foundation for more laws and regulations to be added, the two acts leave
much to be interpreted by the sports leagues themselves. In particular, the regulation of athlete-agents and the defining of the agentathlete relationship are left primarily to the players associations.
The players associations (labor unions) of the major sports in
the United States hold most of the responsibility to regulate athleteagents. Players associations derive their authority from the National
Labor Relations Act, which states they have the power to regulate
athlete-agents.32 Each players association has set forth regulations that
are supposed to work with state and federal laws that concern athleteagents. These regulations set by the players associations are more restrictive and defining than the federal laws and many state laws.
The players associations’ regulations encompass all services
provided by the athlete-agent. For example, the NFLPA’s regulations
cover the providing of counsel with respect to negotiating their individual contracts with Clubs, as well as “any other activity or conduct
which directly bears upon the Contract Advisor’s integrity, competence or ability to properly represent individual NFL players and the
NFLPA in contract negotiations.”33 The other players associations
have established similar regulations regarding the scope of their
regulation. For the purpose of simplicity, in this paper I will use the
NFLPA’s regulations as a representative of the players associations’
regulations from the other leagues.34 The seemingly comprehensive
coverage could explain the lack of protection provided by state and
31

Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7807
(2004) [hereinafter SPARTA].

32

National Labor Relations Act § 9 U.S.C. 9(a) (2012).

33
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34
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restrictive regulations).
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federal laws for post-collegiate professional athletes. In the players
associations’ regulations, the relationship between an athlete-agent
and an athlete is defined as a fiduciary relationship.35 More specifically, the regulations state that an agent should “act at all times in a
fiduciary capacity on behalf of players.”36 However, the regulations
do not prohibit athlete-agents from providing financial services to
clients, which can lead to conflict and lawsuits, as is seen in the
Rosenhaus example. Although the players associations are more effective in defining many aspects of the relatinship between athletes
and athlete-agents than the UAAA and SPARTA, they still fail to address the fiduciary conflict that exists concerning the athlete-agents’
ability to perform so many services, specifically financial services.
The failure of the players associations as well as the UAAA and
SPARTA allow athlete-agents to engage in practices that violate
their fiduciary duty. Section III will discuss threats to the fiduciary
relationship between agent and athlete despite laws and regulations,
which ineffectively control the behavior of athlete-agents towards
their clients.

III. The Agent-Athlete Relationship
Federal and state laws, as well as the regulations set forth by the
players associations, explicitly, and implicitly, define the relationship
between an athlete-agent and an athlete as a fiduciary relationship.
A fiduciary relationship between athlete-agent and athlete requires
the athlete-agent to act in the best interest of the athlete in all services entrusted to the athlete-agent. The regulations established by
the players associations do not restrict the range of services that
the athlete-agent can perform on behalf of the athlete. The services
that an athlete-agent can perform range from contract negotiation to
money management, and even to estate planning.37 This is the deficiency in the laws and regulations that most often leads to fraud and
35

NFLPA, supra note 7 § 3.A(17).

36
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37
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mismanagement on the side of the athlete-agent. Fraud and mismanagement occur among many other high-income professions, however, athletes are particularly vulnerable due to the breadth of services
that one individual or firm is allowed to provide to athletes, as well
as the nature of professional sports, which requires the athlete to
focus solely on their performance on the field.38
In addition to giving counsel in contract negotiations, athleteagents often offer a wide range of financial services to their clients,
permitted under the current laws and regulations. Some agents work
for agency firms that employ several people in order to handle the
athlete’s finances. On the other hand, some agents operate individually, separate from any firm, and act as an agent, financial advisor,
and asset manager. Regardless of whether the athlete-agent works as
an individual or a part of a larger firm, the separation of services is
necessary to avoid a conflict of interest, which disrupts the fiduciary
relationship that is expressed in the laws and regulations concerning
athlete-agents.
The conflict of interest occurs when an athlete-agent negotiates
a contract for the athlete, and then uses the athlete’s money that was
made from the contract to invest in the agent’s private endeavors.
Many times the athlete-agents are neither financial advisors nor financial managers, but rather have connections to them. This often
leads to poor investments that were the result of pure self-interest
on the side of the athlete-agent. The law should obligate the athleteagent to have the athlete’s best interest in mind while acting on his/
her behalf, thus complying with their fiduciary role. However, the
law fails to fulfill this purpose, thus, leading to the agent violating
the fiduciary duty.
One prominent example is of former financial advisor and
founder of the sports agency Global Sports and Entertainment,
Donald Lukens. Lukens convinced several professional athletes to
allow his firm to represent them in contract negotiations and accept
their investment management services. Lukens and his firm used
the money made from the successfully negotiated contracts to invest

38
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in supposedly “safe” and “secure” investment vehicles.39 These vehicles were in reality quite risky and the SEC filed a complaint alleging
that Lukens “duped” hundreds of clients, including several NBA and
NFL athletes.40 Although Donald Lukens’ firm defrauded hundreds
of high-income individuals, who were not professional athletes, the
fact that Lukens and his firm were allowed to represent professional
athletes in contract negotiations and then invest the money earned by
the athlete in high-risk investments constitutes a conflict of interest.
This destroys the fiduciary relationship defined by the current laws
and regulations. The fact that current laws and regulations do not
separate services that are allowed to be carried out by one individual
or firm has led to such unlawful incidents, and will continue to do so
unless something is changed.
The need to separate an athlete-agent’s duties in order to preserve the fiduciary relationship is seen in the example of John W.
Gillette Jr. Throughout the 1990’s Gillette built up his business with
high profile clients such as all-pro linebacker Junior Seau.41 However
in 1998, Gillette was sentenced to 10 years in prison, after he had
defrauded his clients out of more than $11 million.42 According to
the SEC, Gillette “made materially false and misleading statements”
and “converted clients’ funds to his own use.”43 The lack of a separation of an agent’s responsibilities allows the athlete-agent control
over the production of funds, the distribution, as well as investment.
The fact that Gillette converted clients’ funds to his own use clearly
illustrates that the athletes’ best interests were not in mind when
Gillette negotiated the athletes’ contracts. When the athlete-agent
negotiates contracts and represents the athlete in order to gain funds
for his/her investment purposes, it breaks the structure of a fiduciary
39

Shropshire & Davis, supra note 15, at 75.

40

Id.

41
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42
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relationship, in which the agent must act only according to the best
interests of the principal (the athlete).44
The NFLPA regulations concerning contract advisors as is found
in section 3(B) prohibits:
Holding or seeking to hold, either directly or indirectly, a financial interest in any professional NFL club or in any other
business entity when such investment could create an actual
conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest
in the representation of NFL players.45
Since players associations’ regulations apply to all of the agent’s
activities that affect their clients, this particular regulation should
resolve the problem that this article discusses. However, the fact remains, that the athlete-agent is not prohibited from benefitting from
investments and other financial advice based upon the money that
is earned by the athlete through successfully negotiated contracts,
which sets up a situation that automatically creates an inherent conflict of interest. It is possible that the athlete-agent’s intention is to
negotiate a contract in order to coerce the athlete give that money
back so that the athlete-agent can use that money to make even more
money through other services. This does not comply with the concept of a fiduciary relationship as is outlined in current laws46 and
regulations.47
The enforcement of the above-mentioned subsection found in
section 3(B) has been played out in court. The ruling, however, provides an interpretation of a breach of fiduciary duty that brings the
current non-separation of duties of athlete-agents into question. In
Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz,48 the defendant, Jerry A. Argovitz,
was found to have committed a breach of fiduciary duty towards

44

Fiduciary Duty, supra note 13.

45

NFLPA, supra note 7 § 3.B(7).

46

SPARTA, supra note 31.

47

NFLPA: Section 3.A.(17). Accessed on 24 Aug 2014.

48

Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, supra note 4.
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his client, Billy Sims.49 Argovitz had a financial interest in both, the
Detroit Lions and the now defunct Houston Gamblers, and he inappropriately exercised his influence by withholding information from
his client for personal gain. According to the ruling, he “manipulated Sims’ contract negotiations with the Lions in light of his own
interest in the Gamblers,”50 thus breaching his fiduciary duty to his
client. This ruling shows that once the athlete-agent compromises
the athlete’s best interest, it is a breach of the fiduciary duty that an
athlete-agent has towards his/her client.
This ruling could also apply to an athlete-agent, who negotiates
his/her client’s contract and then acts as an investment manager and/
or advisor, taking the money to invest it. It is highly likely that the
athlete-agent will be influenced by the opportunity to make money
off of the money from the contract, so a law must be made to create
more roadblocks to prevent agents from doing so. This is a volatile situation in which the athlete-agent is prone to earn even more
money by acting as a money manager. Therefore, the athlete-agent
is hindered in his/her ability to fulfill his/her fiduciary duty towards
the client, because the contract negotiations are tainted by the opportunity to use the money earned through the contract to make even
more money for the athlete-agent. A separation of an athlete-agent’s
duties will help get rid of the all-too-common fraud, mismanagement and violations of the fiduciary relationship. The firm and/or
individual that represent an athlete should only be involved in either
contract negotiations or fund management, not both.

IV. The Separation of Duties—A Solution
The multiplicity of clashing responsibilities claimed by athleteagents causes a conflict that violates the agents’ fiduciary duty.
Therefore, a clear distinction between responsibilities must be made
that disallows athlete-agents to engage in both contract negotiations
and other activities that involve the investment and/or advisement of
the money made from the contract. In short, a separation of duties
49

Id.

50

Id.
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must be implemented in either a national law, or within the players
association’s regulations.
While this proposed solution would not eliminate all violations
of fiduciary duties among athlete-agents, it would reduce the number of lawsuits and threats of lawsuits from professional athletes.
The proposed solution would also be effective in preventing inherent
violations of fiduciary duties found in the way the laws and regulations are currently structured. In order to more clearly show how
this would be possible it is helpful to apply the separation of duties
retroactively to the previously mentioned incident of Donald Lukens.
After Lukens would negotiate his clients’ contracts, he would
invest their money in financially unstable companies, telling his clients that they were “safe” investments. The issue of providing poor
advisement on false information was exacerbated by the fact that
he was previously acting as his clients’ contract negotiator. If a law
or regulation was enacted that would prevent Lukens from offering
financial advisement after he negotiated their contracts, his clients
would not have been subject to Lukens’ shortcomings as a financial advisor; his clients would be forced to seek financial advisement
elsewhere. Lukens’ role as a contract negotiator became ambiguous
with his role as a financial advisor.
Although many athlete agents are also registered financial
advisors,51 the problem is that the line between roles of contract
negotiator and financial advisor has become ambiguous. This creates an environment for plausible deniability by the athlete agent.
An athlete agent could argue that his poor advisement was given to
his client as a friend from the relationship they developed through
the contract negotiations, which would relieve him of violations to
the fiduciary duty. A law or regulation to more clearly define the
fiduciary duty would remove plausible deniability of fiduciary duty
from financial advisement. Financial advisors are held to their own
standards, which differ from athlete agents.
It could also be argued that a separation of duties would reduce
the efficiency of the individual athlete-agents as well as sports agencies. Instead of performing all services for an athlete, the athlete
51

Champion, supra note 11.
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must search out multiple individuals or firms for contract negotiations and financial management. Although this is a valid argument,
the inconvenience does not outweight the breaches of fiduciary
responsibility that are currently allowed. In addition, a law would
actually make the industry more easily regulated because it would
separate the legal standards and duties of athlete agents from financial advisors, thus reducing the ambiguity and in turn, the legal issues surrounding the profession. Enacting a law or regulation will
result in fewer corruptions of athlete agents in financial advisement.

IV. Conclusion
The athlete-agent industry is as competitive as ever considering
the record size contracts that are under negotiation in every major
sports league in the country. Wherever there is an opportunity to
earn large amounts of money in a relative short amount of time, there
will be opportunities to commit fraud and to violate certain duties.
Strict regulation is needed in these circumstances. Although the current laws and regulations concerning athlete-agents are fairly comprehensive, they fail to protect athletes by allowing athlete-agents to
engage in a wide range of services that result in a conflict of interest,
and thus, a breach of the fiduciary relationship. A separation of duties would prevent fraud, instead of catching it after it has already
happened. Hopefully, as sports becomes more commercialized and
athletes become more valuable, the laws and regulations will conform appropriately by applying stricter definitions of an athleteagents’ responsibilities.

